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Abstract. Psychologists are increasingly interested in embodiment based on the assumption that 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are grounded in bodily interaction with the environment. We examine 
how embodiment is used in social psychology, and explore the ways in which embodied approaches 
enrich traditional theories. Although research in this area is burgeoning, much of it has been more 
descriptive than explanatory. We provide a critical discussion of the trajectory of embodiment research in 
social psychology. We contend that future researchers should engage in a phenomenon-based approach, 
highlight the theoretical boundary conditions and mediators involved, explore novel action-relevant 
outcome measures, and address the role of individual differences broadly defined. Such research will 
likely provide a more explanatory account of the role of embodiment in general terms as well as how it 
expands the knowledge base in social psychology.  
 
 
 Does thinking about one’s unethical behavior lead to a desire to choose an antiseptic wipe over 
a pencil? Does holding a heavy versus light clipboard cause people to more positively rate the resume of 
a job candidate? Do people perceive a manager to be more powerful if that manager is depicted higher 
on a chart of a company’s organizational structure? Such questions would have seemed dubious just ten 
years ago; however, in order to shed light on how the human mind works social psychologists have been 
examining questions like these using an embodied approach as a guide.  
 Several core assumptions of the developing field of embodied cognition (for a discussion, see 
Wilson, 2002) are highly compatible with how social psychologists have traditionally approached their 
key topic, namely the study of  how the presence of others affects thoughts, feelings, and behaviors 
(Ross, Lepper, & Ward, 2010). Having long emphasized the power of situations as well as goals (for an 
early history, see Krech & Crutchfield, 1948), social psychologists always assumed that cognition is 
situated and action oriented. Their subject matter also never allowed them to fully ignore bodily 
processes, which are centrally involved in many social phenomena, from emotion to mating to 
aggression. Hence, social psychology was very receptive to the notion of embodiment, which refers to 
the assumption that thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are grounded in sensory experiences and bodily 
states (for reviews, see Barsalou, 2008; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; 
Spellman & Schnall, 2009). The contention is that mental processes involve simulations of body-related 
perceptions and actions, for which a variety of different, not mutually exclusive, conceptualizations has 
been offered. Some note that we “evolved from creatures whose neural resources were devoted 
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primarily to perceptual and motoric processing” (Wilson, 2002, p. 625) and suggest that higher mental 
processes reuse evolutionarily older programs (Anderson, 2010); others emphasize developmental 
processes and suggest that our early experiences with the physical world (e.g., moving around in space) 
structure our later understanding or representation of more abstract concepts (e.g., likes and dislikes), a 
process referred to as scaffolding (Williams, Huang, & Bargh, 2009).  
 Embodied processes have often been identified by the examination of common metaphors in 
which abstract target concepts are described using concrete source concepts derived from perceptual 
experience. For example, a bad relationship is described as a “distant” one, whereas a good relationship 
is described as a “close” one likely because we are often physically near people we like and physically 
distant from people we dislike. One approach considers metaphors the key driver, rather than only a 
reflection, of embodied influences (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). Not surprisingly, metaphors figure 
prominently in social life (for a review, see Landau, Meier, & Keefer, 2010); whether such metaphors are 
a manifestation (Anderson, 2010; Williams et al., 2009), a reinforcement (Landau et al., 2010), or the 
cause (Lakoff & Johnson, 1990) of embodiment effects in social judgment and behavior is a topic of 
some controversy.  
 Despite a long tradition of compatible theorizing, embodiment has only recently developed into 
a distinct theoretical approach in social psychology (e.g., Niedenthal et al., 2005; Schubert & Semin, 
2009; Semin & Smith, 2002). This review addresses how embodied approaches are used to examine 
social behavior; it is illustrative rather than exhaustive and emphasizes the metaphor related work that 
found most interest in social psychology. We first illustrate how embodiment is explored in social 
psychology and then examine the trajectory of embodiment in social psychology, highlighting some 
promising future directions.   
 
The Use of Embodiment in Social Psychology 
 Although embodied theories started gaining steam in the 1990s (Barsalou, 1999; Gibbs, 2006), 
approaches related to embodiment have a long tradition in social psychology. From addressing how 
physiological arousal affects emotions (Schachter, 1959) to examining the influence of high 
temperatures on aggressive behaviors (Griffit & Veitch, 1971), social psychologists have traditionally 
been aware that people think, feel, and act inside their bodies. Their work revealed how sensory, motor, 
and perceptual processes influence thoughts, feelings, and behaviors before this enterprise received a 
unifying framework with the development of embodied theories. For example, Wells and Petty (1980) 
showed that people who engaged in vertical (nodding) rather than horizontal (shaking) head 
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movements were more likely to agree with a message; Zajonc, Pietromonaco, and Bargh (1982) found 
that chewing gum while viewing faces interfered with participants’ later memory for those faces by 
impairing mimicry; Frank and Gilovich (1988) observed that athletes who wore darker (versus lighter) 
uniforms committed more malevolent behavior; and Strack, Martin, and Stepper (1988) found that 
people rated cartoons as funnier if they held a pen with their teeth (facilitating a smile) rather than their 
lips (inhibiting a smile).  
 While social psychological research that explicitly uses an “embodied” language is fairly new, 
even this work builds on a long tradition. For example, consider some early work by Solarz (1960). He 
found that people are faster at initiating motor movements towards themselves when viewing words 
with a positive meaning, but at initiating motor movements away from themselves when viewing words 
with a negative meaning. Although not couched in embodied terms, Solarz’s (1960) findings suggest that 
approach and avoidance movements become part of our representation of evaluations. We have 
extensive experience physically moving our bodies toward things we like (e.g., a tantalizing cocktail), but 
away from things we dislike (e.g., a slithering snake). Eventually, through repeated experiences and the 
accompanying metaphors, evaluations become grounded in perceptions of physical distance and in 
actions related to enhancing or decreasing that distance. Indeed, more recent research revealed many 
ways in which physical distance influences behavior. For example, physical distance manipulations bias 
people’s perception of their psychological bonds with family members (Williams & Bargh, 2008a), 
evaluative judgments (Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993), and anger-related experiences (Hauser, 
Carter, & Meier, 2009).  
 Other recent work tested whether metaphors that figure prominently in everyday discourse 
about social phenomena reflect embodied processes. Such work illuminates whether the representation 
of a concept depends upon basic physical experience and addresses how the physical experience, in 
turn, affects cognition, emotion, and behavior. Reflecting the metaphorical link between physical and 
moral cleanliness (e.g., “a clean conscience”), researchers  found, for example, that cleaning one’s hands 
with soap or an antiseptic wipe can alleviate the guilt of moral transgressions (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006) 
and influence one’s moral judgment (Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008); conversely, engaging in unethical 
behavior increases the appeal of cleaning products and one’s willingness to pay for them (Lee & 
Schwarz, 2010a; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). The findings also suggest that the effects are modality 
specific – lying with one’s mouth increases the appeal of mouthwash but not of hand sanitizer, whereas 
the reverse holds for typing the lie with one’s hands (Lee & Schwarz, 2010a). Exploring the metaphorical 
links between physical and social temperature (e.g., “showing someone a cold shoulder”; having “a 
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warm disposition”), researchers found that participants perceive others as “warmer” after they held a 
warm rather than cold cup of coffee (Williams & Bargh, 2008b; see also Ijzerman & Semin, 2010) and 
experience a room as physically colder after having been socially rejected (Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008). 
Other work highlighted the impact of metaphorical links between verticality and power (e.g., “high in 
the hierarchy”; Schubert, 2005), affect (e.g., “feeling down in the dumps”; Crawford, Margolies, Drake, 
& Murphy, 2006; Meier & Robinson, 2004), divinity (Meier, Hauser, Robinson, Friesen, & Schjeldahl, 
2007) and other variables. 
 The insights offered by embodied approaches have also enriched existing accounts of social 
judgment, as examples from person perception may illustrate. In a classic study, Carver, Ganellen, 
Froming, and Chambers (1983, Experiment 1) showed participants a videotape of a hostile or non-
hostile interaction between a boss and employee. Next, in a supposedly unrelated task, participants 
judged the ambiguous behavior of a hypothetical individual. Participants exposed to the hostile 
interaction viewed the hypothetical individual as more hostile as well. Mere semantic priming with 
hostility-related words has the same effect (Srull & Wyer, 1979) and social cognition explanations of the 
Carver et al. (1983) results trace them to increased concept accessibility (Higgins, 1996; Todorov & 
Bargh, 2002). Going beyond mere differences in concept accessibility, embodied approaches assume 
that exposure to a hostile social interaction causes participants to simulate or re-enact the sensations, 
perceptions, and motor processes of previous hostile confrontations (Barsalou, 1999), which then 
influence the impressions formed of an unrelated individual. Such accounts contend that bodily states 
(e.g., motor movements) are an integral aspect of the representation of hostility.  
A study by Chandler and Schwarz (2009) can illustrate the different perspectives. Participants 
read a paragraph about Donald (taken from Srull & Wyer, 1979) who behaved in ambiguously aggressive 
ways. While doing this, participants moved their hands in a steady rhythm through a motion detector, 
ostensibly as part of a study on multi-tasking. Depending on conditions, Donald was paired with an arm 
movement that involved an extended middle-finger (as in “the finger”) or thumb (as in “thumbs up”), 
though these terms were never used and the digits were referred to as “digit A, B” and so on. Extending 
the middle finger increased perceptions of Donald as hostile, but did not affect perceptions of traits 
unrelated to hostility; this parallels the influence of semantic “hostility” primes. In contrast, extending 
the thumb resulted in more favorable judgments on all traits, including traits unrelated to hostility (e.g., 
smart). What remains open is whether motor action is (i) sufficient to produce this effect (as Chandler & 
Schwarz, 2009, concluded) because motor action, just like semantic priming, can affect concept 
accessibility or (ii) necessary because all comprehension involves bodily simulation (as others suggested; 
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e.g., Barsalou, 1999); from the latter perspective, the influence of semantic priming manipulations is 
mediated by the associated covert simulations. Such questions and research can enrich social 
psychological analyses of impression formation, as is the case for embodiment research in other 
domains of social behavior, including persuasion (Sherman, Gangi, & White, 2010), political attitudes 
(Oppenheimer & Trail, 2010), and helping behavior (Liljenquist, Zhong, & Galinsky, 2010).  
 
The Trajectory of Embodiment in Social Psychology 
 The exploration of embodied metaphors has led to many memorable findings of everyday 
interest that have spurred much attention for the field. But observers increasingly wonder how much 
can be learned by repeatedly showing that metaphors have “real” consequences (Landau et al., 2010). 
This state of affairs reflects that social psychologists (and others) have focused on the first step involved 
in any new research program, namely demonstrating that there is, indeed, a finding worth studying. This 
step is usually followed by more extensive description before different process accounts are refined and 
juxtaposed (cf. Rozin, 2009). An increasing number of observers from multiple disciplines suggest that it 
is time to focus more explicitly on theory testing and application (Landau et al., 2010; Schubert & Semin, 
2009). Acknowledging this need, we examine the possible trajectory of embodiment research across 
four areas, a phenomenon-based focus, theoretical boundary conditions and mediators, action-relevant 
outcome measures, and individual differences. 
 
A Phenomenon-Based Focus 
 Current embodiment research in social psychology typically aims to identify whether a concept 
or related metaphor is embodied. This approach usually starts with the identification of a metaphor 
followed by a test of whether the metaphor is suggestive of embodied processes. For example, Meier 
and Robinson (2004) proposed that the concept of affect is grounded in spatial perceptions because 
metaphors routinely describe affective concepts using descriptors of vertical space (“I’m feeling down 
today”). If so, affective judgments should be biased by verticality manipulations. Indeed, they found that 
people were more efficient at determining that a word had a positive meaning if the word appeared in 
the top section of a computer screen, but more efficient at determining that a word had a negative 
meaning if the word appeared in the bottom section of a computer screen.  
 While identifying whether a concept or metaphor is embodied is an important contribution, and 
a necessary first research step, there is little to be gained from extending this strategy to each of the 
plethora of concepts and accompanying metaphors. Thus, researchers are beginning to approach the 
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study of embodiment in social psychology be starting with a phenomenon-based focus rather than a 
metaphor-based focus, as suggested by Landau et al. (2010). This approach begins by focusing on a 
particular behavior (e.g., loving, eating, hurting, helping, etc.) and then examines how embodied 
theories can be used to explain and modify the behavior in predictable ways; it also examines the 
situations and contexts in which the behavior is more or less likely to be affected by embodied 
processes. 
 As an example, consider recent research into cognitive dissonance, that is, the aversive tension 
that arises when people are faced with inconsistent cognitions (Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 
1999). When choosing between two attractive options (e.g., attending Harvard versus attending 
Princeton) dissonance results from the attractive features of Harvard that one forgoes by choosing 
Princeton (or vice versa). To reduce dissonance, people typically enhance the chosen option and 
downgrade the non-chosen option, thus bringing their perception of the choice alternatives into line 
with the choice made. Building on embodiment research in the domain of moral judgment, where Zhong 
and Liljenquist (2006) showed that guilt about one’s own moral transgressions can be “washed away” by 
a physical cleansing, Lee and Schwarz (2010b) speculated that hand washing might more generally 
remove traces of the past by metaphorically “wiping the slate clean.” If so, it may also reduce the 
dissonance arising from past decisions. Indeed, merely cleaning one’s hands with soap or an antiseptic 
wipe after a difficult choice was sufficient to eliminate changes in the evaluation of choice alternatives.  
 This example illustrates how an embodied approach can raise new questions about classic 
findings while broadening the exploration of embodied process beyond the core metaphors that usually 
capture researchers’ initial attention. With regard to post-decisional dissonance, the findings indicate 
that metaphorically washing one’s hands of one’s decision can eliminate the need for cognitive 
reevaluation of the alternatives, potentially by allowing a distancing from the decision that reduces 
further contemplation of foregone benefits. The findings also highlight that moral impurity (Schnall et 
al., 2008; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006) is not the only things that can be “washed away”; physical cleansing 
can “wipe the slate clean” (Lee & Schwarz, 2011) by metaphorically removing traces of the past that are 
not only related to moral issues. Hence, it can attenuate or eliminate a broad range of otherwise robust 
effects of past behavior, from the impact of difficult choices on later evaluations (Lee & Schwarz, 2010b) 
and the influence of winning or losing streaks on subsequent risk taking (Xu, Zwick, & Schwarz, 2011) to 
the effects of lingering romantic memories on general well-being (Lee, Shaw, & Schwarz, 2011), inviting 
new questions about evaluative judgment, risk taking, coping, and related issues. 
 
Running Head: EMBODIMENT IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY                                        8 
Theoretical Boundary Conditions and Mediators 
 To date, the fascination of novel and surprising findings has often taken priority over the 
identification of theoretical boundary conditions and mediators. This is likely to change and researchers 
are beginning to test boundary conditions that make embodied processes more or less likely to 
influence behavior. For example, if a particular behavior is expected to be influenced by motor actions 
and/or body-related perceptions, then using a theoretically consistent manipulation to remove the 
influence of the body on the behavior would provide compelling support for embodiment. As an 
illustration, consider research by Foroni and Semin (2009). They examined the role of embodiment in 
emotion language and found that reading action words for positive emotional expressions (e.g., smile) 
activated smile muscles more than reading adjectives that were simply positive in nature (e.g., funny). 
Thus, they concluded that emotion language is not symbolic but embodied. Importantly, they further 
found that exposure to action words for positive (e.g., smile) versus negative (e.g., frown) emotion 
expressions caused people to rate cartoons as funnier, but not when participants held a pen between 
their lips, which inhibited the activation of facial muscles. This research reveals that positive evaluations 
are partially based upon the bodily actions (activation of smile muscles) involved in happy experiences, 
and blocking these actions reduces positive evaluations. Thus, Foroni and Semin (2009) showed a 
boundary condition that is theoretically consistent with the embodiment of emotion language.  
 In addition to testing boundary conditions, researchers are beginning to explore the meditating 
or intervening variables that guide embodied behavior. Although any particular behavior is likely to have 
multiple mediators, the identification of significant mediators helps clarify how or why an effect occurs 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986). To date, few studies have focused on mediators, in part because current 
theorizing does not typically specify mediators and in part because many potential mediators are 
difficult to assess. Regarding the link of physical and social warmth, Kang, Williams, Clark, Gray, and 
Bargh (2010) used fMRI techniques to show that insular regions sensitive to physical warmth perception 
were structurally associated with regions reactive to violations of trust when participants played a 
decision-making game involving trust-related behavior. In other words, at least some embodied 
metaphor effects may be physically instantiated or mediated in brain structure and function. 
Landau et al. (2011) provide another compelling example of mediation. They examined the 
embodiment of the self in terms of physical expansion, noting that people often describe the self as a 
physical entity that can expand or contract (e.g., “let me inside of your head”, “I want to grow inside”). 
They reasoned that exposing people to an image of an expanding figure (e.g., squares becoming larger) 
versus a static or fragmented figure would lead people to feel more self-actualized because a “growing” 
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self is a self-actualizing self. Furthermore, they predicted that accessibility of the concept of expansion 
(e.g., thoughts like “grow” and “broaden”) would mediate the effect. Indeed, participants exposed to an 
expanding physical image perceived themselves as more self-actualized and this was mediated by 
accessible thoughts related to the concept of expansion. Thus, Landau et al.’s (2011) research shows 
that exposure to visual stimuli primes concepts of expansion, which in turn influence metaphorically 
related social perceptions. Such process orientated research is necessary to provide a thorough 
understanding of the pathways that lead from “embodied” manipulations to observed cognitive, 
affective or behavioral effects.                                  
 
Action-Relevant Outcome Measures 
Among the various approaches that share similar assumptions, simple and more radical versions 
of embodiment theories can be discerned (Clark, 1999). The simple view states that bodily cues play an 
important role, but the body is conceptualized as a contextual factor that constrains a process that 
would otherwise happen invariantly. This version of embodiment implicitly holds on to the 
computational metaphor of traditional cognitive science while viewing the body as just another input 
factor, an add-on feature so to speak. In contrast, a more radical view necessitates rethinking of the 
content area of cognition, and how to study it (Clark, 1999). Such radical approaches to embodiment 
propose that traditional conceptions of the cognitive apparatus are misguided because they 
underappreciate the close interconnections of the body, the brain, and the world. Such approaches 
question the sequential nature of cognitive computation or even question the notion of internal 
cognitive representation itself.  
Large parts of the evidence within social psychology are compatible with a weak or simple 
approach to embodiment, as defined by Clark (1999). For example, studies manipulating bodily cues can 
still follow the computational metaphor. However, because embodied approaches presume an intricate 
link between action and perception, the ultimate goal of embodied approaches should not be to 
investigate the influence of embodied factors on cognition, but to clarify the influence of embodied 
factors on action. Hence, an embodied approach requires a reorientation from focusing on cognition to 
focusing on behavior. As Baumeister, Vohs and Funder (2007) noted, current psychological research 
does not generally focus on actual behavior. A more radical approach to implementing embodiment 
would be to consider outcome measures that are clearly linked to action, preferably testing whether 
thoughts and feelings serve as mediators. For example, perceptual measures such as estimates of hill 
slant have been used because they take into account the body’s current resources to perform actions 
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(e.g., Schnall, Harber, Stefanucci, & Proffitt, 2008; Schnall, Zadra, & Proffitt, 2010). Similarly, priming 
people with aggressive concepts can lead to different responses depending on what actions are 
appropriate in a specific physical environment, such as a “fight” response when the person is confined 
to a small room, but a “flight” response when the person is in an open field (Cesario, Plaks, Hagiwara, 
Navarrete, & Higgins, 2010). If we are to take seriously the idea that cognition stands in the service of 
action, researchers will need to study actions in relevant contexts, or at least processes of social 
cognition that have immediate relevance for specific actions. 
 
Individual Differences   
Little is known about the role of individual differences in the embodiment of behavior. 
Embodiment theorists (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Gibbs, 2006; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Niedenthal et al., 
2005) have routinely focused on fundamental cognitive processes without attending to how individuals 
differ. In a straightforward sense, personality theory contends that people’s thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors vary in predictable ways across individuals (Carver & Scheier, 2007; Robinson, 2004, 2007). 
Accordingly, personality theory is likely to be integrated into embodied approaches. For example, 
Landau et al. (2010) contend that people who have a tendency to avoid abstractness or complexity may 
be more likely to use embodied metaphors to guide or make sense of their actions.  
Some researchers have considered the role of individual differences in the familiarity, usage, 
and motivation of the abstract and concrete concepts involved in embodied behavior. For example, 
individuals may have a preference for using metaphors that highlight or downplay information in a way 
that accords with their motivation to maintain specific beliefs or behaviors. Consistent with this notion, 
Moeller, Robinson, and Zabelina (2008; also see Robinson, Zabelina, Ode, & Moeller, 2008; Meier, 
Sellbom, & Wygant, 2007) found that people who report being more dominant in their social lives are 
also more proficient in using the vertical (versus horizontal) dimension of visual space. Thus, individuals 
who have a motivation to exert power over others also excel in using a sensory domain (i.e., visual 
attention in the vertical domain) that is consistent with metaphors for social power. Similarly, Sherman 
and Clore (2009) found that individuals with a high desire for physical cleanliness have stronger 
automatic associations between morality and immorality and the colors white and black, respectively, 
than individuals for whom cleanliness is not as important. These results suggest that individual 
differences are associated with metaphor-consistent behavior, but such work merely scratches the 
surface, and leaves plenty of room for further advancement. 
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In addition to personality-related individual differences, other critical individual differences 
might relate to people’s varying levels of bodily ability. For example, to clarify mediating variables and 
mechanisms, it will be highly illuminating to examine physical abilities that tend to decay over the 
lifespan, after injury, or through declining physical health (e.g., vision, hearing, and physical strength). 
For example, might elderly people represent their social environments differently because they have 
limited physical capabilities? Furthermore, might a person’s representation of their world change after a 
physical injury or declining health? Research by Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) suggests that such variables 
can influence embodiment. They found that elderly people and individuals in declining health perceive 
hills as steeper, reflecting their decreasing ability to climb them. Future research of this type can explore 
to a much greater extent the manner in which embodied constraints on behavior are innate or instead, 
malleable across physical disabilities and the lifespan.  
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 An increasing number of social psychologists are joining researchers in cognitive psychology, 
neuroscience, and developmental psychology in exploring the embodiment of behavior. The current 
research is innovative and provides a welcome perspective to the field. However, the current research is 
in its early stages and tends to be descriptive rather than explanatory. We believe the trajectory of 
embodiment in social psychology is heading towards a deeper level of understanding and is beginning to 
focus on phenomenon-based studies, theoretical boundary conditions and mediators, action-relevant 
outcome measures, and individual differences in a broadly defined manner. Research of this type will 
further open the door for collaborative work between social psychology and other disciplines and will 
likely provide significant contributions to what could be a major approach to the study of behavior.  
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